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HISTORIOGRAPHIC ESSAY
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aSchool of HSOC, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA; bPhilosophy and History of Science, 
Department of Sociology, Philosophy and Anthropology and Exeter Centre for the Study of the Life Sciences 
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ABSTRACT
This paper mobilizes a transnational approach to intervene in the 
unfolding history of the Covid-19 pandemic, advocating for nation-
ally based, interdependent initiatives that push back against the 
fragmentation of national responses and, eventually, national pro-
tectionism. Focusing on the governance of digital technologies for 
data sharing, and using two case studies as illustrations, we 
describe the emergence of transnational realms of scientific and 
political cooperation, that were structured to foster interdepen-
dence, to bypass insular nationalism, and to subvert digital feudal-
ism. By critically reading these case studies through the lens of the 
transnational flows of knowledge across borders, we exploit the 
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Introduction: national fragmentation and transnational responses to 
a global pandemic
Late in 2019 an unknown and highly infectious variant of the Corona virus was carried by 
a bat to a live-food market in Wuhan, China, from where it travelled undetected in human 
hosts across local, national, and international borders. Despite repeated and increasingly 
urgent warnings by the Director General of the World Health Organization (WHO) – on 
30 January 2020, after a visit to China, he confirmed the importance of human-to-human 
transmission and declared ‘a public health emergency of international concern over the 
global outbreak of novel coronavirus’ – most governments chose to downplay, or even to 
deny the significance of the outbreak.1 When they did get under way, national responses 
were irregular and incoherent. As the pandemic progressed different countries diverged in 
their longer-term response and interpretations of safety measures, creating a highly volatile 
political and public health environment. In North America, it was Canada’s and Mexico’s 
turn to call for border walls, following the failure of the United States government to 
contain the virus. In Europe, the re-opening of borders was accompanied by a dramatic 
clash in Brussels between Northern and Southern states concerning the scope and terms of 
the financial investment required to address the crisis and, more fundamentally, the 
meaning and implications of transnational solidarity at such a fundamental turning point.
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Scientific efforts to understand its mode of transmission, and to break its circulation 
began as soon as the novelty of the Sars-CoV-2 virus was evident. In some fields there 
was an extraordinary degree of collaboration between members of the international 
research community exploring measures to stop the pandemic. By the end of April 
more than 200 clinical trials in search of a vaccine, or at least a palliative, had been 
launched around the world,2 resulting in the identification of effective vaccines by 
November – an unprecedented scientific feat. That being said, while everyone made use 
of shared resources such as genomic research on the virus, the results of which were 
circulated online as soon as they were generated, many of the groups working on 
specific vaccines did so under a cloud of secrecy and in competition with each other. 
Meanwhile, data sharing in the clinical realm was hampered by lack of adequate 
infrastructures, as in the attempt to analyze and compare clinical observational studies 
made between February and May 2020, where it became clear that there was no global 
agreement nor set of venues where people working on medical frontlines such as 
general practitioners (GPs) and hospital workers could share their observations. 
Scientific internationalism was also often sidelined and researchers reverted to natio-
nalistic, inward looking work. This resulted in a chaotic landscape where most (and 
most crucial) observations were kept locally (e.g. in many cases, they were faxed rather 
than shared digitally due to local habits and rules). At the same time, many leading 
researchers in epidemiology and public health found themselves urgently drafted into 
national government response teams, which made them focus their work primarily at 
the national level and away from international collaboration. A ‘global’ response 
fragmented into a patchy archipelago of uncoordinated data collection initiatives in 
many domains, aggravated by the efforts of the Trump administration, in particular, to 
secure a vaccine from any promising (Western) R and D lab for exclusive use in the 
United States. This retreat behind national walls was accompanied by US withdrawal 
from the WHO on the grounds that it was a puppet of the Beijing regime, further 
undermining a coordinated global response to the pandemic.
Such tensions between the local and the global are neither novel nor surprising though 
their specific expression in 2020 deserves close scrutiny. Historians have long documen-
ted how pandemics display the fragility of the human-nature balance in the global 
ecosystem. The overwhelming power of non-human actants to disrupt the course of 
history on a world scale has inspired a range of popular and scholarly accounts that seek 
to disentangle the environmental, social and political factors that decimate populations, 
and that brutally expose structural inequalities in human societies.3 The scale of these 
disasters can grant so much narrative power to geography and the environment as to 
render human intervention almost meaningless.4 At the other extreme, scientific tri-
umphalism holds out the promise of eradicating disease from the planet altogether.5 
Situated between such extremes, nationally based studies that navigate between the 
global, the national and the local are able to provide far more nuanced accounts of the 
interplay between disease vectors; institutional, scientific, and industrial responses; the 
material practices of disease eradication among local populations.6 Our study is aligned 
with these approaches in that it takes the nation state and its governance of public health 
as a key actor, but engages explicitly with the STS literature by situating it as a node in the 
construction of the ‘knowledge infrastructure’ that has been mobilized to deal with the 
pandemic.
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Paul Edwards defines knowledge infrastructures as ‘robust networks of people, arti-
facts and institutions that generate, share and maintain specific knowledge about the 
human and natural worlds’.7 Our study probes into the negotiations between research 
communities, global data management platforms like Apple and Google, different types 
of international organizations, and national governments to construct a knowledge 
infrastructure to deal with the pandemic in ways that respect individual freedom, 
national sovereignty and global equity. We position ourselves, methodologically, and in 
our case studies, against a fragmentation of national responses to the global pandemic – 
and the associated lure of techno-nationalist protectionism. We exemplify and advocate 
the material possibility and political desirability of organizing transnational collaborative 
research and development efforts that are structured to protect national control over 
digitally based health policies while also contributing to responsible cross-border knowl-
edge sharing. As we shall illustrate, such knowledge sharing can be explicitly aimed to 
denationalize data of relevance to health, including medical data from individuals and 
groups, and manage them on interoperable platforms – while also retaining national 
accountability for protecting digital and human rights of the data subjects in question, 
and cultivating a transnational interpretation of the very idea of ‘public good’. Indeed, the 
state can play a crucial role in developing and implementing safeguards for personal data 
sharing and incentives towards transnational approaches to public health, which in turn 
make it possible to disseminate and re-use data across borders.
Transnational history that follows knowledge as it travels across borders is 
a particularly valuable methodological and political tool to facilitate and support this 
approach to global emergencies.8 It is precisely control over information, data and 
other forms of knowledge that is at the core of current techno-political conflicts 
between national governments advocating for enhanced transnational and regional 
cooperation, on the one hand, and global corporate capitalist giants, like Apple and 
Google, as well as protectionist political regimes (as was exemplified by the Trump 
administration), on the other. In this paper we document recent efforts to construct 
a knowledge infrastructure – and a related political and moral economy – that 
embraces shared standards for national data collection and cross-border appropriation, 
mobilization and interoperability.
We focus on two case studies. The first describes the confrontation between two data- 
management apps running on smartphones to trace exposure to the Covid virus. One, 
adopted by the German government, was promoted by U.S. corporate communication 
giants Apple and Google. The other (StopCovid) was developed transnationally by the 
French research ecosystem in collaboration with German partners. These different 
technopolitical choices are indicative of deep national histories and related imaginaries 
of the public good that mingle and clash in transnational cooperation, as well as of the 
power of monopolistic technological platforms such as offered by the Google-Apple- 
Facebook-Amazon complex (GAFA) to elude governmental control. The second case 
study concerns the garnering of expertise at record speed on how to handle medical data 
of crucial significance to the outbreak response, focusing on the efforts made by 
a bottom-up transnational initiative of the Research Data Alliance (RDA) – the Covid- 
19 Working Group – between March and June 2020. The collaborative space within 
which the RDA operated, which evades the narrow constraints dictated by national logics 
while at the same time drawing key support and expertise from several governments, 
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emphasizes the opportunities offered by science and technology as vehicles for new forms 
of translational dialogue and agency.
Reflection on and comparison of these two cases grounds our broader analysis of 
scientific and technological responses to the Coronavirus pandemic. These efforts 
involved sustained dialogue between researchers, national governments, technology 
firms, citizen organizations and international agencies, thus offering a window on the 
conditions for transnational collaboration in research on Covid-19. Documenting such 
efforts is a way for historians to contribute to building imagined futures in which relevant 
actors engage in a collective effort, driven from the bottom-up, to ensure that everyone, 
including the most vulnerable victims of Covid-19, benefit from the knowledge – and the 
vaccine – that can contain its spread.
This essay is but a small step towards understanding an event that will no doubt leave 
a major trace on twenty-first century history along with other global shocks like climate 
change, and keep historians engaged for decades ahead. We lack the historical perspec-
tive that comes with the passage of time, of course. But as demonstrated by broader 
ongoing efforts within Science & Technology Studies (STS),9 we do have some tools and 
methodologies that help to cast a critical gaze over the knowledge-related claims made by 
multiple stakeholders in the current crisis, bringing a historically informed perspective 
on the role of technology and its intersection with evolving political and social land-
scapes. A transnational history that takes knowledge as its object of analysis can situate 
itself at the heart of an ongoing struggle for control over the production and sharing/ 
denying of scientific, technological and medical knowledge, and can reimagine the 
capacity of the nation state, through transnational modes of cooperation and goal setting, 
to reshape global forces in defense of national/regional sovereignty, human (including 
digital) rights, and global justice.
This agenda requires making our normative commitments and stakes, including the 
political implications of our views on the relation between the national, the transna-
tional and the global, explicit and central to our research. We have developed such 
commitments through the study of transnational history of knowledge flows – a choice 
of approach that itself reflects our own international heritage and sensitivities, honed 
through detailed engagement with empirical materials documenting the role of govern-
ments, institutions and policies in the development of science and technology. In 
Krige’s case, a long-term engagement with historical scholarship on scientific and 
technological collaboration in European institutions, and his later studies on how the 
American state regulated the circulation of science and technology to promote its 
global political interests, has sensitized him to the centrality of negotiations over 
knowledge flows at national borders in transnational analyses. For her part, Leonelli 
draws on historical, social scientific and philosophical research on the development of 
data-intensive research over the last fifty years, and particularly scientific and policy 
debates around the shape and implications of digitally mediated modes of scientific 
communication, which included the study of historical sources and archives as well as 
participant observation and interviews with key actors (some of which became colla-
borators, as Leonelli got involved in the development of major data infrastructures and 
Open Science policies).
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France’s StopCovid proximity tracing app10
Early in April 2020 the French Minister of Health and the Secretary of State for Digital 
Affairs promoted the development of a ‘national’ proximity tracing app, StopCovid, as 
a ‘response to both a medical and a social urgency: to do all that we can to avoid 
a resurgence of the epidemic, of new victims, and another lockdown’.11 In line with 
monitoring plans rolled out by many other governments, the app would be down-
loaded onto smartphones, connected to a central server, and would alert a user if she or 
he had spent some time in close proximity to an infected individual in the previous few 
weeks. French tech was mobilized to develop, test and release a device in collaboration 
with European partners and with a firm commitment to respect to the utmost the 
privacy of the user. At about the same time two American giants in the digital realm, 
Apple and Google announced that they were also developing together a proximity 
tracing app that could be downloaded on smartphones, but that stored all relevant data 
on the phones themselves (a ‘decentralized’ approach), so providing a higher degree of 
personal security than the ‘centralized’ French-type version. This new development was 
widely hailed as a major contribution to public health and to the protection of 
individual liberties. Some governments, and that in Germany in particular, embraced 
it enthusiastically.
This move stimulated a widespread debate on the ethical and political implications of 
‘centralized’ vs ‘decentralized’ proximity tracing apps. For the French state, digital and 
national sovereignty over the management of a health care crisis was a central plank of 
a national health system that had well-defined protocols for respecting the personal 
privacy of medical records. There the ‘googlization’ of public health was widely viewed 
as yet another step in the global expansion of neo-liberal, market-driven technological 
innovations that bypassed national regulatory systems in the name of protecting indivi-
dual freedom. For the proponents of the Apple and Google app, the sharing of private 
data with a national government agency posed a dire threat to individual liberty. As one 
privacy consultant enthused ‘the most efficient privacy regulators in the world right now 
are Apple and Google’.12 Here then we have a confrontation between a transnational 
technological project embedded in a national health system and a corporate based 
technological fix that decouples data collection entirely from the health services that 
need it, and leaves each potentially infected individual the freedom to choose whether or 
not she wishes to inform local health authorities of her condition.
StopCovid was developed by a transnational research consortium embedded in the 
French research ecosystem with public and private partners. Their aim was to build 
a device that could help bring the pandemic under control at national and regional levels 
without violating its users’ rights to privacy, and that sought to ensure interoperability by 
exploiting the technical standards, mechanisms and services made available by PEPP-PT 
(Pan-European Privacy Protecting Proximity Tracing).13 The project was led by Bruno 
Sportisse, the CEO of Inria, the Institut nationale de recherche pour les sciences et 
technologies. A small group of French and German experts built the technical backbone 
of the app, called ROBERT (ROBust and privacy-presERving proximity Tracing).14 
Other partners included the National Institute for Health and Medical Research 
(Inserm), major high-tech corporations like Dassault and Thales, Orange, a global 
French telecommunications company, and smaller specialized firms (Lunabee studio 
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for developing apps, Withings specializing in the internet of things and Capgemini, 
which developed the back-end architecture).
The broader social questions at stake were discussed by a large number of official 
bodies that watched over the medical, ethical, legal and social aspects of the project as it 
unfolded. These included the French National Academy of Medicine, the Commission 
Nationale de L’informatique et des Libertés, a national committee dealing with ethics 
and informatics, the National Consultative Committee on Human Rights, the 
European Center for Disease Prevention and Control, and the government’s Conseil 
Scientifique that comprises about 60 experts, mostly in various fields of medicine and 
public health, and that provided scientific input and advice throughout the pandemic to 
the government and to the public.15 The app was tested for three days in mid-May, 
debated in the French National Assembly and the Senate on 27 May, and made 
available to the public on 2 June.16
From the outset StopCovid was conceived in the midst of the pandemic as a strategy to 
trace infected people after the lockdown was gradually relaxed beginning on 
11 May 2020. Reflecting some of the specificities of life in France, it was designed to 
alert an individual who had spent some 15 minutes in proximity (about 1 meter) to an 
infected person, typically while using public transport or in a crowded indoor space. The 
same approach was adopted in Latvia where Ilea Ilves, an adviser to the president on 
digital policy, explains that they developed an app to ‘use smartphones to perform the 
otherwise arduous and labour-intensive task of contact tracing’, so mirroring what 
‘public health authorities do anyway in the analogue world: manually trace contacts 
between infected individuals and people with whom they have come into contact’.17
The StopCovid app was designed to protect individual liberties and privacy as much as 
possible, compatible within its overall goal of breaking the chain of transmission. Unlike 
similar apps in some Asian countries including Taiwan and Singapore, it did not use 
geolocation data, but exploited the Bluetooth installed on the phone to share signals with 
other users. This was a tracing, not a tracking app. Anyone who downloaded the app was 
regularly sent batches of fleeting crypto-identifiers to their smartphone. These encrypted 
data were picked up and temporarily stored in the smartphone of anyone else in 
‘proximity’ who had downloaded the app. If an individual was tested positive she was 
given a code to upload on her device, that then alerted everyone else carrying 
a smartphone that had stored her crypto-identifiers, as well as a central data base, that 
he or she was at risk. The possibly-infected individual thus informed – or rather the 
smartphone they had with them, as all of this was anonymous – would then be advised as 
to what steps to take to curb further possible transmission.18
The transnational structure of the StopCovid collaboration was achieved by combin-
ing the skills of a French team called PRIVATICS with those of four German colleagues 
from AISEC, the Fraunhofer Society’s cybersecurity institute. Inrea’s Sportisse could not 
conceal his admiration for the French group that he described as ‘the pride of French 
research in computer science and informatics’, and as ‘experts in high-level IT concepts 
(concerning cryptographic protocols and transmission protocols) and with a firm grasp 
of the relevant ethical and societal issues’.19 He also emphasized the spirit of collabora-
tion at the European level in the development of shared technical standards developed by 
PEPP-PT ensuring desired functionality. One typical example: Bluetooth was not devised 
to accurately estimate the distance between two smartphones. Its efficacy was affected by 
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an individual’s physiology, the position and type of her smartphone, the charge of its 
battery and so on. Several European teams worked together to create calibration tests to 
be used in statistical models that corrected these variations. This shared commitment 
overcame differences of opinion over some technical decisions, and different emphases 
‘on the issues of digital and technological sovereignty’. Political considerations were 
interwoven with technical choices, allowing for national apps that used shared compo-
nents running on technological infrastructures provided by global corporate giants.
The developers of StopCovid stressed that no one was obliged to install the app, that 
users could choose to disable their Bluetooth when it was installed, that it preserved 
their anonymity at every step, that it was not a tracking app, like those used for 
geolocalisation, and that it was not a ‘surveillance app’. Sportisse insisted that 
StopCovid ‘has been designed in such a way that NOBODY, not even the government, 
has access to the list of people diagnosed as positive or to the list of social interactions 
between people’ (his emphasis).20
In April, 2020 Apple and Google announced that they were developing an alternative 
system – a contact tracing app that enabled owners of Apple and Android phones to 
communicate with each other. It shared all the features built into StopCovid but one – 
data was stored and processed on user’s phones themselves, rather than being sent to 
a central server. This ‘decentralized’ system was heralded as having distinct advantages 
as regards privacy over ‘centralized’ systems like that being developed by the French 
and many other governments. The new entry into the field caused many governments 
to reassess their technical approaches to contact tracing, with quite a few of them 
dropping plans for a national app, and opting for the app proposed by Apple and 
Google.21 Notably those included Germany, the original partner for the StopCovid 
project, as well as the UK, whose government had initially attempted to set up an app 
explicitly targeted at population surveillance. The British app allowed the government 
to access and re-purpose personal data on travel, location and health. It was heavily 
critiqued by data ethics experts22 and the project was eventually abandoned in favor of 
the Apple/Google alternative.23
The significance of describing the Apple and Google app as a ‘decentralized’ system 
connecting ‘independent’ users without recourse to a ‘central’ server was not lost on 
Sportisse. As he put it, ‘the term “centralized” is often used with the deliberate intent of 
implicitly stigmatizing a state as wanting to survey people’.24 And there can be no doubt 
that a centralized data base carries undesirable risks with it, notably the accumulation of 
personal data that has little to do with contact tracing, and of course the risk of state 
surveillance.25 This is clearly exemplified in the UK case, and by the highly successful 
Chinese strategy, which includes sourcing the location history of each citizen from major 
social media providers such as Alipay and WeChat, resulting in a system primed to 
control citizen mobility and access to medical care.26
The corporate alternative posed its own threats to individual privacy, however. In fact 
when the app was first announced the French Conseil Scientifique turned the tables, and 
said that it was the decentralized alternative that did not provide sufficient guarantees 
regarding the protection of personal privacy and medical data, because ways of hacking 
into smartphones were freely available on the web.27 It is also interesting that Apple and 
Google were reported as saying that they would maintain the ability to disable their app 
on a regional basis ‘once the current crisis is over’,28 whether or not national 
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governments saw any need to keep them active. It was not clear why they wanted to keep 
this option open, but their remark suggested that Apple and Google were exploiting the 
opportunity provided by a crisis to extend their undoubted expertise in managing ‘big 
data’ into the domain of public health, thus gaining access to the huge user base that 
uploaded the app. Such strategies have been well-documented as part of the business 
model for so-called platform capitalism instantiated by the GAFA group.29 It is ironic 
that whereas these champions of individual liberty would not apparently commit to 
disabling their apps when the pandemic was under control, the French government was 
legally obliged to switch off StopCovid when it judged that the health crisis was over.
Indeed by denying healthcare workers direct access to information on infected 
patients in the name of privacy, a ‘decentralized’ tracking app could actually harm 
the health of the sick individual and those whom she encountered. Ilea Ilves has 
stressed that most infected people were willing to take precautionary measures that 
might be financially or professionally disadvantageous if they were engaged in an 
informed, non-coercive conversation with a health care specialist.30 Google and 
Apple’s app precluded this option by only allowing third parties access to data on 
who was potentially infected if the individual herself chose to provide it. This particular 
interpretation of individual control over privacy came at the cost of undermining 
efforts by health authorities to break the chain of transmission, and placed all respon-
sibility for managing and preserving one’s rights on the shoulders of app users. This 
mirrored the US approach to healthcare as the responsibility of individuals, but 
diverged dramatically from European views of the state as responsible guarantor for 
the common good. As Tamar Sharon points out, it was not a coincidence that the 
Apple/Google app had been enthusiastically championed in countries like the US and 
the UK, where the public sector had been shrunk by successive policies to ‘roll back’ the 
state in favor of the market.
Both of these firms imposed limits on the power of sovereign states to use apps stored 
on smartphones to manage the spread of the virus. First, they ‘refused to open their 
technology to governments pushing for centralized data storage [. . .]’.31 What is more 
they asserted their monopoly by only allowing one app to be validated and owned per 
country. Certainly the French app could run on a smartphone using Bluetooth – but with 
reduced efficacy since it was ‘backgrounded’ when another app or game was being used 
on the same device, and it was switched off when the phone was in sleep mode.32 ‘Do 
Google or Apple get to tell a democratically elected government or its public health 
institutions what they may or may not have on an app?’ asks Ieva Ilves.33 For the Conseil 
Scientifique the answer was evident: ‘The French government holds that the protection of 
the health of the French people is the exclusive role of the State, and not of private 
international actors’.34
And here is the rub. What was at stake in the battle of the apps was the power of 
a nation state to define and implement a contact tracing app that was embedded in its 
national health policies to control the pandemic, that worked effectively on 
a smartphone, and that was interoperable with the app developed by Apple and 
Google. The French authorities regarded this as a fundamental question of national 
digital and political sovereignty. The Commission Superieure du Numerique et des 
Postes (the High Commission for Digital and Postal Affairs responsible for electronic 
and postal communications) was particularly outspoken on this matter. In giving their 
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input on the plans to develop StopCovid they stated that ‘the dependence of the STOP 
COVID device on modifications that have to be made to operating systems of certain 
foreign companies simply reflects the power relationships that have been put in place 
over several years between nation states and the GAFA in other domains’. Remarking 
that the new app proposed by Google and Apple that was being adopted by several 
governments ‘clearly interfered’ with the development of the French device, the High 
Commission observed that ‘the Secretary of State has made it clear that the French 
authorities will be intransigent, and will not allow anyone to impose their choices on the 
management of the public health crisis and the instruments developed for it, and is ready 
to abandon the development of the application Stop Covid if these conditions are not 
met’.35 The Conseil Scientifique reinforced this point by describing one of a number of 
possible scenarios in which the rapid introduction of major technological innovations at 
a time of emergency could generate irreversible, technology-dependent systemic changes 
to the public health system that were difficult to control in a context of national and 
global restructuration.36
As we mentioned above, to the chagrin of the French, late in April the German 
government announced that it was abandoning the development of a national app 
using the European protocols defined by PEPP-PT that had been devised by 130 scientists 
including those in the Fraunhofer Research Institute and the Robert Koch Institute for 
public health.37 Like the UK before it, Germany would adopt the solution offered by 
Apple and Google, believing it to be the likeliest to guarantee confidentiality and avoid 
any semblance of serving as a mass surveillance system. For instance, senior officials in 
Angela Merkel’s government argued that they preferred a ‘decentralized system’ of data 
storage limited exclusively to users’ smartphones. ‘Our aim’, they said, ‘is to have an 
application for tracking available as soon as possible, and one that is widely accepted by 
the population’. They were evidently impacted by an open letter published shortly before 
by about 300 university researchers exhorting the government to adopt the Google Apple 
proposal as it provided more protection for public privacy, the thorn in the side of any 
centralized project.38
Why were the reassurances and substantive arguments provided by the French 
research and ethical instances brushed aside? The answer lies in the deep histories of 
the countries themselves, in ways that we can only skate over here. French govern-
ments, since at least the Vth Republic inaugurated by President de Gaulle have 
frequently defined their national identity and national sovereignty in terms of 
opposition to what they see as the overbearing power of the United States, be it in 
Europe or in NATO.39 This undercurrent of mistrust extended to corporate giants 
like Apple and Google, aggravated by their ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ attitude to the adop-
tion of their app, and amplified by their strategies of ‘fiscal optimization’. As for 
Germany, one contributor to a forum on surveillance in German history that was 
stimulated by Edward Snowden’s revelations of the NSA’s (National Security Agency) 
mass surveillance programs, defined the resistance against state invasions of privacy 
in these terms: ‘the history of murder, the Holocaust, persecution, surveillance and 
denunciation in Nazi Germany and that of the Stasi in the GDR inspired the German 
reaction to the NSA scandal. No more Holocaust, no more state repression, no more 
Leviathan in the bedroom: “never again!” is the message to be learnt from German 
history’.40
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Transnational cooperation in the development of tracing technologies does not only 
require developing shared standards and protocols to manage data-collection and inter-
pretation. It also requires interoperability between the apps installed on individual users’ 
smartphones. Apple and Google sought to ‘impose’ interoperability by demanding 
(initially at least) that they have sole access to each country’s user base: no national app 
could be installed along with theirs.41 They levered the protection of individual privacy to 
subvert state-based ‘centralized’ systems, and to secure access to a potentially vast base of 
users who uploaded their app onto smartphones. They posed a corporate alternative to 
transnationally brokered systems whose interoperability was assured by using standards 
agreed upon collectively by the representatives of European governments. Conflicting 
national interests – sharpened by the very different histories of the relations between the 
state and civil society in France and Germany – fragmented the European response to 
Covid 19 in this domain along national lines. The ability of transnationally brokered, 
nationally-based tracing technologies to oppose the monopolistic solution offered by 
Apple and Google was thus thwarted by deep-rooted, and legitimate anxieties over state 
abuse of private data, along with the preponderance of power in favor of the GAFA. 
These corporate giants have been able to impose global technological solutions on 
national governments that are widely embraced by millions of individual users, but 
that evade regulatory policies that give substance to national sovereignty.
The transnational governance of Covid-19 research data
Situations where agreements on common problems and paths towards technical solu-
tions need to be molded through the prism of conflicting national interests pose a crucial 
challenge to transnational transactions. In many ways, this is where the true significance 
and enormous diplomatic potential of such transactions and resulting agreements or 
rupture are manifested, as nations come to consider and compare the moral, political and 
infrastructural economy of their response to specific issues. This is also where the 
invitation to look closely at what happens with knowledge ‘at the borders’ matters the 
most. In this section, we consider a case of work at the borders that, contrary to the 
StopCovid case, is not centered on the resolution of a problem at the national scale, but 
rather on coordinating the production and management of regional and even institu-
tional-level medical records in order to facilitate their dissemination and comparative 
analysis at a global – or at least international – scale. This is the technical, social and 
diplomatic labor invested in standards, venues and guidelines to share data collected by 
frontline medical staff based in different parts of the world.42 Such data include measure-
ments taken by family physicians and general practitioners, who are often tasked with 
diagnosing coronavirus symptoms and supporting the (often long) recovery of patients, 
and clinical observations made by hospital workers involved in assisting patients in 
intensive care units.43
There is no underestimating how crucial the prompt circulation and analysis of such 
data is to help governments prepare and respond to local conditions. Consider for instance 
clinical data on the level of oxygen saturation in the blood of Covid patients. Already by 
early March 2020, reports from China and Italy alerted frontline medics of the importance 
of measuring oxygen levels in suspected Covid patients. It was noted that many patients 
who were being hospitalized exhibited surprisingly low levels of oxygen – equivalent to 
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severe deprivation, or hypoxia, and typically associated with much more severe symptoms 
than those displayed at the time of hospital admission.44 Through analysis of such data, 
local doctors started to hypothesize that Covid-19 attacked human hosts in ways comple-
tely different from known viruses (and certainly from influenza), namely by causing 
irreparable damage to patients’ respiratory system well before its symptoms became 
pronounced enough for those patients to seek hospitalization.45 If true, this observation 
would explain why so many patients were arriving in hospitals too late to avoid invasive 
interventions and lengthy recovery times – and in fact, far too often, too late to be kept alive 
at all. The obvious implication of this finding was that early detection of low oxygen levels 
was crucial to identify patients in need of assistance before they became untreatable – thus 
saving lives as well as hospital beds and resources. In European countries, this meant 
seeking the help of family physicians, who are in the best position to regularly monitor the 
oxygen levels of people within their clinics who exhibit mild symptoms.
This apparently simple solution turned out to be extremely difficult to implement, for 
a number of reasons. First, the evaluation of these kinds of data was widely viewed as 
anecdotal, hard to lift from its local context and unreliable because collected outside of 
controlled conditions. It did not easily fit the evidence requirements of predictive 
modelling approaches used in infectious disease epidemiology and privileged by many 
governments including the UK46 Second, many GPs did not have relevant equipment 
and resources to monitor patients in this way. GPs in Italy for instance tended to have at 
least one thousand patients assigned to them and this meant that during the critical phase 
of March and April 2020, they had dozens of patients exhibiting Covid symptoms who 
needed regular checks throughout the day. Measurements were hard to make at 
a distance, so doctors felt responsible for visiting patients in their own homes, resulting 
in some physicians falling ill and even dying due to heavy exposure to the virus. 
Reluctance towards collecting such measurements, understandably, grew. Third, what-
ever data were collected were not stored and compared beyond the local level. As we 
pointed out, it was actually hard to share these data across different parts of the territory, 
or across its borders, since there were no well-established and recognized standards, no 
obvious venues or infrastructures to be used, and no guidelines for how to handle these 
sensitive data securely and responsibly in observance of data privacy laws.
As a result, international recognition of hypoxia as a key cause and potential 
predictor of Covid death only happened towards the end of April 2020, well over two 
months after doctors in Italy had raised the alarm. Gearing medical systems towards 
monitoring oxygen levels and detecting possible hypoxia took even longer, with efforts 
to this aim still ongoing in fall 2020. A digital solution for data collection and sharing 
that could save doctors from unnecessary home visits and ensure the identification of 
rapidly deteriorating patients before they entered a terminal stage was highly desirable. 
In fact one of us worked along with Italian GPs to acquire state funding for an online 
system to collect and monitor oxygen level data from their patients. Our application 
and similar others were however sidelined in favor of more investment on tracing 
technology. This latter effort, as exemplified by our discussion of StopCovid above, was 
certainly significant and legitimate as a strategy to monitor the spread of the virus 
among the population; however, it was often disconnected from the use of digital 
technology to support Covid treatment at the medical frontline, especially in the 
early phases of the disease.
HISTORY AND TECHNOLOGY 11
This example shows the urgency of devising standards, guidelines, technologies and 
venues for the prompt and responsible discussion of highly local medical findings. 
Knowledge does not move transnationally by itself. It requires the construction of shared 
standards and protocols for data collection and sharing, and access to the technological 
infrastructure to circulate it globally. These in turn require the support and uptake of 
institutions – whether private or public, and often in affiliation with national govern-
ments – in charge of the governance and use of health data. Similar problems beset the 
sharing of observational data, not from the doctor’s office, but from the clinic. Local care 
settings and the medical frontline are dominated by local rules for the protection of 
patient privacy and confidentiality, as well as a lack of technologies geared towards 
enabling the systematic and secure archiving of data in a digital form and interoperable 
format. The pandemic brought new urgency to the need to direct expertise and invest-
ment towards ensuring ethical forms of medical data sharing and re-use, which would 
align with effective digital systems for data sorting and analysis. This is the goal that 
a hastily assembled working group of the Research Data Alliance (RDA) set itself in 
March 2020.
The Research Data Alliance (RDA)
The RDA is a grassroots organization formally launched in 2013 to bring together 
researchers interested in data management issues, which quickly grew to encompass 
over 9000 members by the start of 2020.47 Given its already large scope, international 
recognition and inclusivity, the RDA was well-positioned to launch a COVID-19 
Working Group. The group was swiftly organized in five sub-committees, each focus-
ing on a different type of data and comprising up to a hundred expert members: the 
clinical group, the ‘omics’ group, the epidemiology group, the social sciences group and 
the community participation group (aimed at ensuring that data garnered by non- 
scientists, including nurses and social service workers within the medical system, were 
appropriately collected and considered by the research establishment).48 The clinical 
sub-group was chaired by Anne Cambon-Thomsen, Emeritus Research Director of the 
French National Research Centre (CNRS) and a highly respected figure internationally, 
and proceeded swiftly via online meetings (typically at least three per week). Within 
a little over three months, which included a period of consultation around draft 
guidelines, the Covid-19 RDA Working Group was able to launch the final version of 
the RDA COVID-19 Recommendations and Guidelines on transnational data sharing 
covering clinical data, omics practices, epidemiology and social sciences, and ‘comple-
mented by overarching areas focusing on legal and ethical considerations, research 
software, community participation and indigenous data’.49 In addition to the guide-
lines and in the spirit of providing concrete outputs of immediate help to researchers 
around the world, the group published a catalogue of resources to inform the guidelines 
as well as a visualisation tool to facilitate navigation to resources held by different 
stakeholders – a crucial tool given the swift proliferation of data sources of varying 
quality in relation to coronavirus. These outputs were by no means a solution to the 
complex issue of clinical data sharing, but they did constitute an important step 
towards such a solution, and particularly the formulation of a regulatory, moral and 
infrastructural context in which such a solution could be developed.
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It is important to note why organizations such as the RDA were well-positioned to 
achieve what well-established supranational and national institutions had not managed 
to fully deliver. The very purpose of the World Health Organization (WHO) is to make 
transnational dialogue and agency in relation to health less dependent on the whims of 
national (and particularly nationalist) politics, and it may therefore be expected that the 
kind of work performed by the RDA is precisely what the WHO should be carrying out. 
The WHO mission is however set at a high, top-down level, which makes it difficult for 
the organization to engage the nitty gritty details of how data coordination can be 
achieved in everyday data collection across many different fields (not all of which fall 
under the WHO’s traditional remit) and nations. There is no doubt that the WHO has 
played a pivotal role in garnering, integrating and disseminating evidence pouring in 
from medical systems around the world, just as required by its institutional mandate. 
This was made possible by the cooperation of national agencies, which both enabled 
WHO work but also imposed important constraints on it – for instance when a given 
country was reluctant to release formal statistics for political reasons or provided highly 
partial outputs (as in the case of death tolls, where countries such as the UK initially 
refused to include deaths occurring in care homes, and where there was anyhow great 
disparity in the percentage of deaths formally certified as related to a Covid-19 infection). 
Given its direct dependence on the support of nation states, the WHO also found itself in 
the crucible of complex global politics and strongly opposing nationalistic reactions to 
the pandemic, culminating in the United States’s request to leave the organization – 
which demanded a time-consuming reaction.
Similarly, well-established national systems for the collection of data from hospitals 
also played an important role in supporting transnational initiatives for knowledge 
sharing, yet they were more directly susceptible to changing political winds. The US 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, or CDC, is a good example of an organiza-
tion with well-established systems and standards for national data collection on virus 
infections in hospitalized patients, such as the National Healthcare Safety Network which 
was swiftly mobilized and put to work at the start of the coronavirus pandemic. In 
July 2020, however, American hospitals were given a federal order to reroute their data to 
the new data system, HSS Protect Public Data Hub, which was run by a little-known firm 
in Tennessee.50 The reason given for this radical reorganization was the need to coordi-
nate and assemble CDC data with other relevant data coming from different federal 
agencies, such as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Health 
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA). Over a hundred leading medical orga-
nisations however opposed the move, arguing that it constituted an unwarranted chal-
lenge to the expertise and authority of the CDC by the federal government, and it 
heightened the risk of duplication and loss of data significant to the pandemic response: 
‘The administration’s abrupt decision to establish a new data collection procedure that 
bypasses the CDC as a recipient of data on patients hospitalized with COVID-19 is 
alarming and will undermine efforts to control the pandemic at a time when COVID-19 
cases and hospitalizations are surging across the country’.
Under these politically charged circumstances, the lack of widely accepted norms, 
standards, platforms and venues for the compilation, analysis and transnational circula-
tion of observational data from the medical frontline was ever more crippling – and the 
formation of transnational venues where such gaps could be addressed concretely was 
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ever more significant. Initiatives such as the Covid-19 Working Group of the RDA 
retained some independence from the political demands attached to established national 
and international entities. This was partly thanks to their inclusive and bottom-up ethos, 
which made them recipients for the identification of goals that could be realistically 
agreed upon and tackled by many researchers around the world; and partly thanks to the 
temporary nature of their endeavors, which aimed to push specific actions along, 
including the set-up and implementation of transnational guidelines and technologies, 
without having to commit to national sponsors at least in the shorter term. These 
initiatives also involved high-flying scientists from reputable universities, such as 
Cambon-Thomsen in the RDA case, who were in positions of power and leadership 
within their own country and thus able to bring the weight and resources of their 
institutions and national networks into these transnational collaborations. When con-
fronted with hostile governments, as in the case of the Trump administration, these 
individuals’ visibility and influence at the national level could help to temporarily bypass 
national constraints in favor of transnationally organized knowledge sharing that bene-
fited many countries, not least their own.
Transnational scientific groupings act as a cradle for innovation both scientifically and 
politically, producing ideas and proposing possible solutions through the consultation of 
experts from multiple countries and backgrounds.51 Implementing these solutions in full 
requires broader uptake and resources, which is where these transnational venues 
regularly intersect with less ephemeral international institutions that can provide longer- 
term support for changes within and across national borders, as well as a sounding board 
for the political, social and scientific visions elaborated as part of the technical proposals. 
In the case of the Covid-19 Working Group of the RDA, a key established interlocutor 
was the European Commission, which was consulted at the moment of publication of the 
recommendations to help support implementation, as well as at the very start of the 
group to help identify the needs of policy-makers. Many long-standing scientific orga-
nizations also provided extensive support and expertise, such as CODATA, the 
Committee on Data for Science and Technology of the International Council for Science.
Not only does the fast set-up of these ad hoc groups intersect with long-standing 
national and international institutions at various points: it is also made possible through 
well-established, decades-long efforts by interested researchers, funders, scholarly socie-
ties, publishers and science policy-makers to ‘open’ research data and publications, and 
make them available within and across national borders and ownership regimes. Such 
efforts, which were prominently backed by an Open Science committee of the European 
Commission established in 2015, had already proven useful in tackling the Ebola and 
Zika epidemics, enabling at least some of the medical research establishment to collabo-
rate beyond the usual competitive dynamics encouraged by academic and commercial 
success metrics.52 Various national governments, including France, the UK, Australia, 
Germany and Portugal, made crucial contributions to the development and implementa-
tion of Open Science guidelines, including on the significance of Open Data. The launch 
of the French National Open Science Plan in 2018, for instance, added teeth to the EU 
arguments for this mode of research, making it part of the French legal system and 
institutions. Remarkably, the French plan like many others was elaborated in dialogue 
with the RDA, and explicitly recognized the importance of transnational guidance from 
such an organization in developing successful national policy.53 Aside from securing the 
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financial backing of various national funders, such a positioning was crucial to the RDA 
capacity to effect change within scientific systems largely governed by the nation state, 
while also making the RDA into a crucial tool for national governments to access global 
expertise built through transnational knowledge exchange across several local perspec-
tives. Particularly notable was the continuing effort within the RDA to involve diverse 
members: while the majority of RDA membership was based in the US, Europe and 
Australia, the percentage of members from other countries steadily increased, with 144 
countries represented among its 11,000 members in fall 2020, including substantive 
participation by civil servants and government delegates. The RDA acted as a global 
network of expertise linking multiple national actors in a multiplicity of transnational 
programs dedicated to producing and circulating knowledge understood as a common 
good, in explicit opposition to both national protectionism and global digital feudalism.54
Concluding remarks. The political pertinence of transnationalism
Many years ago Jeff Hughes remarked that ‘historians have always grappled with the 
present in their dealings with the past [. . .]’.55 Hughes pointed out that whenever we write 
history we produce a version of the past that aligns it with some readings (readers) and 
not others. He goes on to cite T.G. Ashplant and Adrian Jones who emphasized that ‘all 
historiography rests upon acts of choice. No historiography can ever be a neutral 
enterprise: an enquiry into any aspect of the past necessarily derives from some evalua-
tion in the present. And in the end, or rather in the beginning, all such choices are not 
simply historiographic but political’.56 This is evidently the case when we choose 
a transnational or global mode of historiography. These ways of writing history emerged 
in opposition to a nationally-based approach after ‘the fall of the Berlin wall, the 
crumbling protective ramparts of national capitalism, a boom in container shipping, 
and the rise of the cosmopolis’.57 ‘Bordered imaginations’ were dislodged, and new 
narratives that highlighted circulation, flow and movement through networks of inter-
connection and interdependence moved center-stage.
Transnational histories that take scientific and technological knowledge as their object 
are particularly important modes of intervention into the ongoing global pandemic. 
Notwithstanding dire, if sometimes muddled warnings from China and the WHO, in 
February 2020 most research communities and governments were unprepared for the 
economic and public health crises that soon befell them. When the extent of the 
pandemic was grasped it unleashed a multitude of research initiatives around the globe 
dedicated to understanding the nature of the virus, and containing its spread. Extensive 
financial and human resources were mobilized to collect and process relevant data. By 
engaging with some of these initiatives at an historical moment (summer and fall 2020) 
our analysis of knowledge flows did not ‘open the black box’ of an already achieved 
techno-political ‘solution’. Rather, it excavated the dynamics of knowledge-in-the- 
making at different sites of transnational collaboration that were held together by shared 
material practices of data collection and analysis and framed by agreed goals that gave 
them meaning.
Our case studies confirm what was already well-known to STS scholars – that 
transnational scientific and technological collaboration depends crucially upon agreed 
standards and protocols for the collection and sharing of data across borders, and – we 
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would add – on the need for co-production and interoperability between different 
national strategies and their scientific and technological performance. Prima facie, it 
may seem that what we are suggesting through these two cases is to juxtapose a violent 
imposition of standards by monopolistic corporate actors (as exemplified by the Apple 
Google tracing app) with a multilateral search for commons by the research community 
(as exemplified by the RDA COVID-19 guidelines), with a clear implication that the 
latter is preferable to the former. There is certainly violence involved in the digital 
sovereignty associated to data governance regimes by corporate actors, as amply docu-
mented by scholars working on platform capitalism and its powerful technocratic hold 
on democratic powers around the world.58 In this sense, the StopCovid case is a story of 
resistance in the face of the particular kind of political and economic control exercised 
through standards and infrastructures, stressing the role that the nation state can play in 
exploiting, mediating or countering such power.
And yet, acknowledging the political nature of standardization is not an indictment of 
its crucial role within research.59 Standards are essential to data mobility and to the very 
idea of data and related research practices as forms of cosmopolitan knowledge com-
mons, whose transnational use can benefit humanity the world over.60 Without inter-
operable software, data formats and data sources, it would be impossible to conduct 
much of the research on the impact of COVID-19 on human health and societies – with 
devastating consequences, as demonstrated by the loss of life and livelihoods in countries 
that did not manage to contain the disease.
What the RDA efforts exemplified, then, was not a rejection of standards, but rather 
the value of standardization efforts that recognize their own political nature, associated 
moral economy and social implications. These efforts were thus organized from the get- 
go in ways that actively engaged political actors and countered attempts to impose one 
approach over all others. The main goal of the RDA group was to coordinate rather than 
unify: in other words, to acknowledge and give voice to the diversity of perspectives 
associated with different choices of standards, including their political, social and cultural 
groundings, and reach agreement on how such diversity could be reconciled through 
a set of compatible procedures. At the same time, the very act of coordinating required 
agreement on a specific understanding of research and related interventions, which is 
grounded on consultation and open confrontation rather than insularity. What the RDA 
instantiated was thus a form of consensus-seeking where consensus – and thus the very 
idea of what may constitute a ‘common’ – consisted primarily of a commitment to 
ongoing transnational dialogue. In other words, interoperability standards are not 
viewed as fixed and determined by the adoption of a specific, unique framework (as 
proposed by Google, whose solution to the problem of standardization is that everybody 
use their tools). Interoperability is generated through ongoing transnational transactions 
over how local standards can relate to each other.
This approach to data practices and protocols has a long history and found its most 
explicit expression in early twentieth-century visions of informational knowledge com-
mons that would indeed extend to all corners of the earth.61 Its successful implementa-
tion tethers each individual researcher and research group to multiple networks through 
which knowledge of the virus and its behavior moves, making them at once more visible 
and more accountable to peers and wider publics around the world. At the same time, 
this increased visibility feeds researchers’ reputations and clout at home, and provides 
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a bridge for internationally-emerging expertise to be heard and supported at the national 
level. The RDA group was just one example of the transnational pedagogies being built 
among scientists, communities and governance institutions that allowed for collabora-
tive, concrete and pragmatic approaches to the production and circulation of knowledge 
across national borders, with the express ambition to benefit each participating national 
context. They represented a different imagination of globalization to that forged through 
the Washington Consensus, relying less on the imposition of an imperial top-down order 
and more on consultation among different stakeholders with proven competence to 
tackle the problems at hand. Scientific expertise, and more broadly the ability to combine 
research know-how with an understanding of the role of science in tackling specific social 
challenges, was the main ticket for participation. This was continuously mediated by 
researchers’ status and recognition both within their national settings and beyond 
national borders, which made it a relatively closed space reserved for specific types of 
expertise. At the same time, organizations like the RDA were explicitly committed to 
carving out space for transnational learning that was not marred by prior assumptions of 
‘Northern’ hegemony and/or superiority, especially at a moment where the pandemic 
was exposing the extent to which the Global North was itself highly fragmented, uneven 
in its administration of resources and expertise, and crippled by widespread gender and 
racial biases.62 Paraphrasing Boaventura de Sousa Santos, the hope underpinning this 
commitment is to ‘build an expanded commons’ – indeed, an expanded political and 
social ethos – ‘on the basis of Otherness’63 – and, we add, to ensure the uptake of such 
hard-won commons by national governments around the world. As ongoing debates on 
the history and evolution of commons demonstrate, this is a highly idealized view of 
commons that is constantly subject to recalibration and potential instrumentalization 
depending on changing sociopolitical, technological and economic conditions. The 
dynamic nature of commons is precisely what makes the cultivation of dialogue between 
technical and political forces, including the nation state, crucial to the future vitality and 
effectiveness of this vision.
The combination of expertise emerging through international cooperation and 
concrete mechanisms for national uptake and contributions is what makes transna-
tional transactions so effective. Far from being a distraction from research, the exten-
sive resources that organizations like the RDA – modelled to an extent on the European 
Commission – invested into establishing collaborative relations with nation states was 
integral to their successful contributions to scientific advancements, particularly given 
the prominent role played by national governments in the governance of research 
systems. Reading our case studies through the lens of the transnational travel of 
knowledge across borders, and of the negotiated standards and protocols agreed 
upon at borders to secure interoperability, this paper fuses the engagement of the 
historian with the material practices of people in the front line of the ‘war’ against the 
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